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ABSTRACT school
This thesis analyzes manufactures' warranties and
cannibalization issues as they affect the maintainability
on the E-2C aircraft. The analysis includes cannibalization
structures, reasons why squadrons cannibalize, alternatives
to cannibalization, cannibalization issues that affect
maintenance personnel morale, and the disruptive effects of
manufacturers' warranties to the fleet.
The research identified that introducing production
aircraft to the fleet without proper logistical support
increases aircraft cannibalization and decreases
maintainability. Cannibalization should not be used to
increase aircraft readiness, since it doubles maintenance
man-hours and depletes resources. Inconsistent Aviation
Maintenance and Material Management (AV-3M) data
contributes to aircraft cannibalization. An acquisition
strategy that identifies logistics problems early will give
the logistician an opportunity to decrease cannibalization.
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The E-2B aircraft was first introduced in 1966 as a
replacement for the aging piston engine driven E-1B Tracer
aircraft built by the former Grumman Aircraft Corporation.
The E-2B was the first variant of the E-1B built in the
early 1960 's as an Airborne Early Warning (AEW) platform to
detect and identify enemy aircraft hundreds of miles from
the Battle Group. The E-2B remained in the fleet from 1966-
1973, until replaced by the E-2C. Although the E-2 has gone
through many variations throughout its life, the aircraft
and airframe remain virtually the same.
The E-2C aircraft entered U.S. Navy service with
Airborne Early Warning Squadron 123 at Naval Air Station
(NAS) Norfolk, Virginia in November 1973. During the
1980 's, the E-2C aircraft continued to incorporate
improvements to keep pace with technology advances and the
changing operational environment. In 1984, the original E-
2C model was succeeded by a newer version, with a stronger
radar and avionics package. That model was known as the
Group configuration. In 1988, the Group I version was
introduced, featuring an upgraded T56-A-427 engine. The new
1
engine eliminated operating restrictions imposed by the
aircraft's growing gross weight after incorporating new
systems. In addition, Group I provided anti-jam antennas,
cross-bleed engine starting, and an updated radar with a
high-speed processor that doubled its capacity. December
1991 marked the first deliveries of the current, Group II
version to the Pacific Fleet. Their improved radar
alleviated saturation and tracking overload with additional
avionics systems that made it superior to the Group I
version. The next generation E-2C aircraft, the Hawkeye
2000, is undergoing flight tests at Paxtuent River,
Maryland and should be ready for introduction into the
fleet by the year 2001.
The E-2C aircraft is unique because many of the parts
used to maintain operational availability on the first
version (Group 0) can also be used to maintain the latest
version (Group II) . The ability to integrate components
should create an abundance of parts, but this is not the
case. Many spare parts are not readily available in the
supply system. This problem has contributed to a high
cannibalization rate in the E-2C. Cannibalization, as
defined in this case, is replacing a defective part or
component of one system with an in-use part or component
from another system. This procedure creates three times the
work for the maintenance technician, thereby wasting
valuable assets. Manufacturers' warranties contribute to
high cannibalization rates because Aircraft Intermediate
Maintenance Department (AIMD) technicians are not
authorized to work on warranty items.
This thesis will examine the difficulties in
maintaining the E-2C aircraft for operational use and
reasons the cannibalization rates continue to soar, with
special attention to the advantages and disadvantages of
manufacturers' warranties.
B. PURPOSE
This thesis analytically evaluates problems associated
with manufacturers ' warranties and aircraft
cannibalization. In this era of downsizing and program
scrutiny within the Department of Defense, it has become
increasingly important to use resources efficiently. This
thesis will use the E-2C aircraft to examine personnel,
monetary, and readiness costs, while reviewing the Navy's
operation and maintenance procedures associated with
aircraft cannibalization and warranty issues. Finally, the
thesis will explore and recommend changes that can be
implemented to reduce the burden and frustrations
associated with supporting multiple E-2C configurations.
C. RESEARCH QUESTION
The primary research question is: What are the impacts
of manufacturers' warranties and aircraft cannibalization
on the maintainability of the E-2C aircraft?
D. SCOPE
The thesis will analyze cannibalization, warranty
issues and their effect on the E-2C aircraft. The analysis
includes cannibalization procedures for both the Pacific
and Atlantic fleets; why squadrons cannibalize;
alternatives to cannibalization; morale issues that
cannibalization causes among maintenance personnel; effects
of manufacturers' warranties and why they are potentially
disruptive to the fleet; and monetary costs involved with
the use of a limited military budget. The thesis will
conclude with recommendations to improve management of
aircraft maintenance and make warranty procedures more
cost-effective and responsive to readiness requirements.
E. METHODOLOGY
This thesis will address problems presented to the
fleet using a thorough literature review of pertinent
aviation maintenance records. Data will cover the past
three years of the E-2C aircraft with specific emphasis on
the last two years. Information, will also be collected
from various reports, such as Naval Aviation Logistics Data
Analysis (NALDA) ; Aviation Maintenance Readiness Reports
(AMRR) ; Commander, Airborne Early Warning Wing,
Atlantic/Pacific Fleet ( COMAEWWINGLANT / PAC ) daily status
reports; Naval Aviation Depots (NADEP) North Island,
California, and St. Augestine, Florida, Phased Depot
Maintenance (PDM) reports. Data will also include personal
and telephone interviews with the E-2C item manager, Navy
Inventory Control Point (NAVICP) item manager, and
maintenance officers assigned to COMAEWWINGLANT/PAC.
The overall goal of this thesis is to collect relevant
data, analyze cannibalization and warranty issues
throughout the E-2 community, and implement a plan to
reduce or resolve any concerns that arise.
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II. WARRANTIES IN NAVAL AVIATION MAINTENANCE
A. POLICY
Eleanor R. Spector, Director of Defense Procurement,
has recently rewritten Office of the Secretary of Defense
(OSD) policy concerning warranties for major system
acquisitions. While OSD establishes overall policy for
warranties, each military service is responsible for
tailoring that policy and implementing it within their
respective organization.
The Naval Air Systems Command (NAVAIR) has established
the warranty guide for the naval aviation community. This
guide focuses on logistics policy and processes for the
aviation community. It is NAVAIR policy to pursue cost-
effective warranties on all procurements. The NAVAIR
Program Managers (PMs) are responsible for developing and
including appropriate warranty provisions in contract
solicitations. Integrated product teams are required when
determining warranty requirements. Additionally, warranty
periods (the duration of warranty coverage under contract)
,
must be clearly stated in the solicitation. Warranty
clauses should explain what benefit the Government derives
(e.g., improvement in fleet readiness and mission
effectiveness)
.
A cost/benefit analysis is required to justify using a
warranty. If a warranty can not be supported by a
cost/benefit analysis, then the program manager should not
invest in a warranty. In other words, a warranty provision
should only be included in a contract if it makes good
business sense and is executable in the fleet. The warranty
is the exception rather than the legal requirement. This is
a new policy change that was promulgated by the Director of
Defense Procurements and is reflected in the NAVAIR
warranty guide. [Warranty Guide, 1998] The purpose of the
policy amendment was to eliminate warranty clauses that do
not add value or are not executable in the fleet. There
must be a benefit to the Government in order to include
warranty provisions in the contract.
A warranty is a contractor's promise or affirmation
given to the Government regarding the nature, usefulness,
or condition of the supplies or the performance of service
furnished under the contract. A warranty should protect the
Government (and possibly the contractor in the case of
vendor-provided items) against defective items and
services, promoting quality performance throughout the life
8
of the warranty. A warranty provides a contractual right to
correct defects. Life cycle cost estimates must support
warranty cost/benefit analysis efforts. Warranty cost may
increase or decrease a system's life cycle costs. The
benefits to be gained from a warranty must be proportionate
to the Government's cost of the warranty. The warranty must
be cost-effective to the Government; if it is not; the
warranty should not be purchased.
Several types of warranties are covered under the
NAVAIR warranty guide; however, the researcher will only
discuss two that continue to raise concern throughout naval
aviation organizational and intermediate levels of
maintenance: reliability, and reliability and
maintainability warranties. The objective of reliability
warranties is to reduce failures during intervals between
overhauls. The contract contains an overhaul interval for
specified components and identifies the remedy required
when components experience specified failures before the
next overhaul. It applies to critical, potentially high
failure rate components under a fixed-price contract. If a
component does not measure up to its expected reliability,
it must be replaced before the expected point of wearout to
avoid premature failures. This is very disruptive to the
9
fleet because reliability warranties require that the
failed components be returned to the manufacturer for
repair. The effects on the fleet are discussed later in
this thesis.
Reliability and maintainability warranties motivate
the producer to increase equipment reliability, while
reducing the mean corrective maintenance time (MCMT) . With
such a warranty arrangement, the contract contains a mean
time between failure (MTBF) guarantee for specified
components and a maintainability clause specifying MCMT.
The contract identifies remedies when MTBF or field
maintainability specifications are not met. This warranty
arrangement applies to critical, potentially high-failure
rate installed components under a fixed-price contract.
This warranty has the most detrimental effect on life cycle
costs of any warranty concerning logistics. If the MTBF of
a component is not accurate, the Navy will either over or
under obligate funds to purchase spare components. This
problem continues to demoralize the fleet and will be
discussed later in this thesis.
B . PRACTICES
NAVAIR is the cognizant activity for E-2C aircraft
warranty purchases. NAVAIR is responsible for administering
10
warranties for new E-2C production aircraft as they are
introduced into the fleet. In the E-2C community, there are
many configurations of the aircraft and each configuration
(Group - Group II) comes with its own set of warranty
provisions. This confuses supply and maintenance personnel
in the fleet.
Lisa Sanders, NAVAIR production integrated process
team manager for the E-2C, stated in an interview that
aircraft presently in the fleet have only a small number of
warranty issues at this time, none of which are classified
as major concerns. NAVAIR expects the next wave of warranty
issues for the E-2C to occur in Fiscal Year 01, when
introducing the next generation E-2C aircraft, the Hawkeye
2000.
Lisa Sanders also suggested that the problems that the
fleet is experiencing may have resulted from a
communications breakdown. NAVAIR does not grasp the
magnitude of the current warranty problem, thinking that
this particular configuration of the E-2C was introduced to
the fleet over ten years ago. In NAVAIR 'S eyes, all
production warranties of concern have been identified and
corrected. The fleet, however, continues to have problems
because initial warranty issues are not resolved. This
11
aircraft has many configurations and multiple warranties
that are still of concern. The discrepancies were not
corrected and fixes to the problems were not pursued.
Two examples of how manufacturers ' warranties can
affect the fleet, are offered below. The first example is
"by the book, " or step-by-step, what is expected under a
reliability and maintainability warranty according to
NAVAIR's warranty guide. The second example demonstrates
what happens far too often in the fleet when warranties
fail to meet expectations.
Example One: A production aircraft comes from the
factory and is in use in the fleet. An avionics box that
controls the radar has a MTBF of 2000 operating hours; the
box should average 2000 operating hours before it fails.
However, the box fails at 500 operating hours.
The box is removed by maintenance technicians and
turned in to supply for a replacement. The box (under
warranty to last 2 000 operating hours) is shipped to the
contractor for repair where data is taken and given to the
type wing, program manager, supply activity and various
other entities to record the box's history. The recorded
data is used by the contractor to determine why the box
performed to only one forth of the prescribed reliability.
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If the box failure represents a simple problem and requires
a minor adjustment, the box is repaired and sent back to
the supply center for reissue. If the same box fails at a
premature rate in another aircraft, the contractor must
repair all failures and may implement a no-cost engineering
change proposal (ECP) for reliability and maintainability
(R&M) improvements. MTBF is adjusted accordingly. When a
newly configured aircraft receives the same black box, it
should have the new modifications. This reflects how the
system is supposed to work.
Example Two: Six-production aircraft join the fleet at
the same time and four of them are assigned to a deploying
squadron. The squadron is scheduled for an overseas
deployment within six months after accepting the new
aircraft. After completing battle group work ups (training
exercises), the squadron deploys. The deploying carrier is
set up like all other aircraft carriers in the fleet, with
three E-2C aircraft positioned on the flight deck and one
aircraft located in the hanger bay because of the space
constraints
.
Three weeks into the deployment, two of the four
aircraft experience trouble with an avionics box that
controls the radar. The non-functional boxes render each
13
radar inoperable, downing both aircraft. The E-2C's primary
mission is to use its radar to detect enemy aircraft
approaching the battle group. The non- functional boxes are
replaced with on-hand assets drawn from supply. Supply then
ships the non-functional boxes to the contractor for repair
because they are still under warranty.
The turnaround time to repair both boxes is 45 days,
in addition to the time it will take the boxes to get back
out to the deployed ship. One week later, another box is
non-functional on one of the flight deck aircraft and must
be replaced; however, there are no more boxes in the ship's
Aviation Consolidated Allowance List (AVCAL) . This means
the squadron is down to three operational aircraft. The
ship is about to conduct 24-hour flight operations and
needs all three mission capable aircraft on the flight
deck. The ship cannot easily bring the good aircraft from
the hanger because it is buried in the corner surrounded by
other aircraft; it would be difficult to move without re-
spotting the entire hanger bay. What will the squadron do?
The squadron will take the known good box from the
aircraft in the hanger and install it in the aircraft on
the flight deck leaving, a hole (that is, a missing
component) in the hanger aircraft. This is what the Navy
14
calls a cannibalization action. Cannibalizations will be
discussed thoroughly in chapter three. The third box that
went bad is not sent off the ship. It is inducted into
Aircraft Intermediate Maintenance Department (AIMD) located
on the ship and a maintenance technician will attempt to
repair the box. This maintenance action will void the
warranty and cause the Navy to lose thousands of dollars.
The second example happens all too often, because
warranty provisions are written from the perspective of the
buyer, not the fleet maintainer. Many times the MTBF of a
component or part is incorrect and is actually only a
fraction of the contractor's engineering prediction. The
inventory of spare parts on each ship, determined by the
AVCAL, is based on MTBF of components and the budgeted
funds available to buy them. This means the Navy will only
purchase a fraction of the spares actually needed. This
leads to cannibalization, as described in Example 2 above.
15
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III. CANNIBALIZATION IN NAVAL AVIATION MAINTENANCE
A. POLICY
Cannibalization in Naval Aviation can be simply
defined as removing a serviceable component from one
aircraft and installing it in another aircraft to restore
it to a serviceable condition. In the 1970s, The Chief of
Naval Operations (CNO) recognized the wasted man-hours
involved in cannibalization. The CNO continues to express
great concern over the aircraft maintenance man-hours
wasted every time a maintenance technician cannibalizes a
needed component. These wasted man-hours amount to double
the work. That is, every cannibalization requires dual
component removals and dual component installations.
OPNAVINST 4790. 2G states that "cannibalization with
few exceptions, is a manifestation of a logistic or
maintenance support system failure." It further states that
cannibalization reduces morale and worsens Non Mission
Capable Supply (NMCS) , and Partially Mission Capable Supply
(PMCS) readiness conditions. Type Commanders direct all
commands under their authority to keep cannibalizations to
a minimum. This applies to the Atlantic and Pacific Fleets.
(CNO MSG, 1979)
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The E-2C aircraft is not single sited; therefore, it
receives direction from Commander, Naval Air Force
Atlantic/Pacific Fleet (CNAL/CNAP) , respectively,
concerning cannibalization actions. Each coast is
responsible for producing their own cannibalization
guidance for their assigned E-2C aircraft.
Cannibalizations are historically measured in one of
two ways: the number of cannibalizations per 100 flight
hours, and the total number of items cannibalized in a
specified period (i.e. cannibalizations per month, quarter
or year)
.
Figure 1 displays cannibalizations per 100 flight
hours, per aircraft deployed Atlantic/Pacific fleet and
total E-2C aircraft, from first quarter fiscal year 1998 to
fourth quarter fiscal year 1999. The data shows increasing
cannibalizations during the last three-quarters of fiscal
year 1999. The increase reflects the addition of new E-2C
Group II aircraft to the Atlantic fleet. New aircraft
would normally decrease cannibalizations. However, the new
aircraft encountered supply shortages, requiring
cannibalizations of other E-2C aircraft to maintain minimum
readiness throughout the fleet.
18
Figure 2 provides a better picture of the
cannibalization trends presented in Figure 1. The chart
compares the deployed Atlantic and Pacific fleet
cannibalization numbers during Fiscal years 1998-99. The
Atlantic fleet spike in August of 1999 represented a surge
in operational commitments for the E2C aircraft during that
period.
1Q98 2Q98 3Q98 4Q98 1Q99
FISCAL YEARS
2Q99 3Q99 4Q99
Data not available for Pacific Fleet Deployed third quarter 1998
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Figure 2. Cannibalizations per 100 Flight Hour Deployed
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Functional type wings on each coast establish
cannibalization procedures for their respective squadrons.
Each type wing, although very similar in structure,
administers their cannibalization policy differently. The
overall policy for both coasts continues to be reducing
cannibalization when at all possible.
B. SQUADRON CANNIBALIZATION
The reasons why aircraft squadrons cannibalize vary.
There are as many different reasons to cannibalize as there
are aircraft squadrons and maintenance managers. Each
squadron works in a different management environment with
different constraints as well as different goals to
fulfill. Understanding what cannibalization is and why
cannibalization occurs helps determine how to measure its
overall impact on aviation squadrons.
1. Maintenance Readiness
Readiness is measured against a 24-hour day and a 30-
day month, or a total of 720 hours. Each time the aircraft
is not ready for flight (not mission capable) , the time it
spends in a not ready status is subtracted from 72 hours
to get actual ready time. The readiness measure is a
percentage figure, which is obtained by calculating the
actual ready time and dividing it by 72 hours. The CNO has
21
set a readiness goal for the E-2C aircraft of 70 percent
(5442. 4M)
.
Aircraft readiness is so important to the Navy that it
has become a determining factor in the career success or
failure of maintenance managers and commanding officers.
Aircraft may not be ready for flight for many reasons, most
of which are internal to the squadron; but it is much
easier to blame a supporting supply activity for lack of
readiness than to admit to the world that internal problems
are the primary reasons impacting readiness . To achieve the
70 percent readiness goal, an aircraft must be mission
capable for 504 hours each month. Now with this goal in
mind, cannibalization as it applies to maintenance
readiness can be explained.
The typical squadron maintenance crew, while shore-
based, works in two eight-hour shifts, five days a week
(1/3 to 1/2 of all E-2C squadrons are shore-based at any
given time) . This means, little or no maintenance is
performed on most weekends. Assuming a four-weekend month,
192 hours of readiness time is accumulated over the four
weekends. In other words, 38 percent of the 504 hours
required to meet CNO standards occurs during a time in
which no maintenance is performed. Add in the eight hours
22
a day that a two-shift workforce does not cover, and time
without maintenance increases to 73 percent of the 504
hours necessary to reach CNO standards.
These figures make it very profitable in terms of
readiness to cannibalize on Fridays and during the second
shift on weekdays, even if the aircraft is not needed for
the next day's flight schedule. By cannibalizing from other
aircraft and consolidating material shortages, the negative
effects of supply response times and backorders are
discounted. All that needs to be done is to order a part,
then cannibalize. Why wait on supply system response or
risk a not-in-stock situation when the required readiness
can be achieved through cannibalization? By picking and
choosing cannibalization periods, readiness can be
maximized at the expense of a few extra man-hours. This
policy consolidates NMCS to the minimum number of aircraft,
avoids supply response delays, and maximizes readiness for
the squadron commanding officer. (Myette, 1981)
This policy improves the readiness statistics.
However, it obscures a real problem that we are having in
naval aviation and the E-2C community: shortages of spare
parts. The community has been doing business this way to
protect itself against the backlash of being unable to
23
accomplish CNO goals outright. This common practice has
contributed to our existing cannibalization dilemma.
2 . Material Shortages
The first and probably the most obvious reason for
squadron- level cannibalization is a material shortage where
the local supply system simply does not have a replacement
asset. In this case, the squadron level maintenance manager
has no choice but cannibalization to restore the aircraft
to a mission capable status.
In the case of a material shortage for a replacement
asset that cannot be cannibalized (i.e., an o-ring seal for
a hydraulic actuator), the maintenance manager's only
alternative is to wait for a replacement asset. However,
that aircraft can then become a cannibalization source for
other assets.
Under the Naval Aviation Maintenance Program (NAMP)
,
supply shortages are measured by a not mission capable
supply rate. This rate is expressed as percent impact on
aircraft readiness (OPNAV 4790. 2G, 1998). Aircraft
readiness is obtained by adding the hours in a month that
an aircraft is ready for flight (mission capable) and
dividing that total by 72 hours, the number of hours in a
3 -day month. For example, if an aircraft was mission
24
capable for 600 hours in a month, its readiness would be
600 divided by 720, or 83.3 percent readiness.
Not mission capable supply is computed by summing all
the hours in a month that an aircraft is not ready for
flight (not mission capable) due to material shortages and
dividing that value by 720 hours per 3 day month. For
example, if the sum of NMCS hours was 2 00, then the NMCS
rate would be 200 divided by 720 or 27.7 percent. If NMCS
drives cannibalization, then squadron level cannibalization
should vary as a function of material shortages.
Material shortages will drive an individual decision
to cannibalize, but do not account for overall
cannibalization rates. Squadron level maintenance managers
consolidate unfilled supply requirements to as few aircraft
as possible, to maximize readiness (Myette, 1981) . This
shift is assumed true because no one would cannibalize a
part if a replacement asset were available. Would they?
Actually, this last statement is not entirely correct;
3 to 50 percent of the cannibalizations in the fleet are
for convenience. The assets are in the system, but the
maintenance managers decide that it is faster to pull the
needed parts or components from another aircraft. This
leads to the second reason for cannibalization, having a
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supply asset but not being able to issue the asset to the
squadron in a timely manner.
3 . Supply Response Time
Today's aircraft carrier environment requires aircraft
maintenance managers to launch aircraft in a 2 0-30 minute
launch cycle. The time between completing aircraft recovery
and the next launch sequence of that aircraft is, at most,
30 minutes. A replacement component that takes more than 3
minutes to deliver is of little use to a maintenance
manager for that launch. Even though a local supply
activity could be 100 percent effective in meeting the
CNO'S goal of one hour supply response time, that time
allowance may not come close to meeting the supported
squadron's material needs. Many maintenance managers have
directed a component cannibalized before ordering a
replacement component simply because the component was
needed "now," and not "one hour from now." (Myette, 1981)
4 . Operational Commitments
Many type commanders view operational commitments as
the only valid reason for cannibalization. After all, if
the aircraft is not needed to meet the flight schedule, why
should maintenance technicians expend double maintenance
man-hours just to achieve readiness? This view says,
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"Cannibalize when operational commitments require it and
allow the supply system to react all other times." The CNO
also directs that operational commitments are the only
valid reason for cannibalization in his instructions to
squadron commanding officers. Unfortunately, the CNO still
requires 70 percent readiness.
Squadron commanding officers have so many top
priorities that they can only hope to maintain the status
quo. Their operating rationale is that if readiness is 70
percent, all operational commitments are met and squadron
personnel are relatively happy; to meet the readiness goal,
no one would argue with the associated cannibalization
activity. (Myette, 1981)
The exception: those squadron commanding officers that
have lost aircrew because of a cannibalization action that
went bad. Cannibalization discussions typically presume
that actions are performed smoothly with no problems. Most
of the time that is the case. However, when a part is
cannibalized, when the part is needed "now. " The
maintenance technician may be rushed and inadvertently
damage the part or miss a step that can cause a
catastrophic failure in the air. In addition, double
maintenance activity doubles the possibility of a
27
maintenance mistake. This is an area that all affected
parties must consider, when resorting to cannibalization as
a supply option.
5. Avoiding the Risk of Stock Out or Missed Sortie
The supply system goal, as set out in the NAMP, is to
deliver 90 percent of all squadron issue-group-one material
demanded in one hour. Issue-group-one material is that
material that makes an aircraft not mission capable or
reduced mission capable. This means that, if a supporting
supply activity reaches the established goal, ten percent
of the time some period greater than one hour, and in some
cases weeks, will be required to deliver the additional
issue-group-one material. (Myette, 1981)
In the case of the E-2C aircraft, this 90 percent goal
has never been achieved Navy-wide. The E-2C has averaged 67
percent for the last 12 months. The maintenance manager can
risk ordering a part and waiting for it to be delivered,
knowing that the order will not be filled within one hour
33 percent of the time on average; or cannibalize a sure
thing and not miss a scheduled flight. Many maintenance
managers view cannibalization as risk avoidance in its
purest form.
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6. Troubleshooting a Complex Aircraft
Very few maintenance managers would argue against the
statement that naval aircraft have become increasingly
complex with each generation. Training demands on new
maintenance technicians are far greater than the
requirements placed on past personnel. To minimize the
adverse impact on maintenance and troubleshooting skills,
modern aircraft, such as the E-2C, rely heavily on built-
in-test (BIT) troubleshooting features. BIT simply tells
the maintenance person what is wrong with the system and
which component or components have failed.
This system works well, most of the time, unless the
BIT feature fails or a failure is outside the BIT
diagnostic capability. In the latter case, many error-free
components may be changed before a fault is corrected.
Removing error- free components by a squadron- level
maintenance department is monitored by the supporting
intermediate maintenance activity. This monitoring allows
intermediate maintenance managers to alert squadron- level
maintenance managers of BIT problems or faulty maintenance
personnel training.
Squadron- level maintenance managers and technicians
are caught between a failed BIT system or troubleshooter
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training system and an intermediate maintenance activity
that monitors error- free component removal. To avoid this
dilemma, the maintenance technician uses a known good
system from another aircraft to troubleshoot the suspect
system. Simply put, the maintenance manager directs the
technicians to cannibalize a good aircraft to fault isolate
a bad aircraft.
This type of cannibalization hides poor
troubleshooting performances from the intermediate
maintenance activity and perpetuates marginal BIT system
features. By cannibalizing a good aircraft, to fault
isolate a bad aircraft, squadron level maintenance managers
minimize their error free removal percentages at the cost
of a few extra man-hours. If squadron- level maintenance
managers viewed error free removal reporting by the
intermediate maintenance activity as indicating possible
training or BIT system problems, rather than indicating
poor maintenance management ability, then cannibalization
for troubleshooting would be reduced. (Myette, 1981)
C. TYPE WING PRACTICES
The Atlantic and Pacific fleet type wing policy on
cannibalization is to direct squadrons to cannibalize as
appropriate. Peak cannibalization periods for a squadron
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are predictable by the wing. Spare parts for many of the E-
2C systems are in short supply and necessitate
extraordinary action to overcome these shortages . To
alleviate the shortages, the E-2C wing policy has become to
cannibalize needed parts from returning deployed squadrons.
Example: A squadron returns from a six-month
deployment. The first month is a stand-down period allowing
sailors leave and adjustment time for administrative
matters. Squadrons will normally only schedule flights to
maintain proficiency, allowing aircrew to retain
qualifications. Because of the light flying requirements,
the returning squadron is considered the prime
cannibalization squadron for the next deploying squadron.
The E-2C wing is responsible for ensuring that a deploying
squadron is as close as possible to fully mission capable
(FMC) . If a replacement part is needed and not available in
the supply system, the wing will direct that stand-down
squadron to remove the needed part from one of their
aircraft and give that part to the deploying squadron.
This action causes a ripple effect. The squadron that
surrendered the part completes a maintenance action form
(MAF) to document the cannibalization. This MAF enters the
supply system indicating that this squadron has a supply
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problem; in reality, there may be no shortage of parts in
that squadron, only a cannibalization directed by the wing.
The MAF information is stored in a database. When reviewed
by maintenance managers it will look as if the
cannibalization was required when, in reality, it was
directed. This scenario reverses itself for the receiving
squadron. There is no documentation about the real problem
of unavailable parts, because the requisition has been
artificially filled.
Another option for the East Coast to acquire parts is
using the E-2C training command. The training command has
four times the aircraft of a normal fleet squadron. Because
of these extra aircraft, the Atlantic wing has more choice
about where they acquire a needed part
.
The entire cannibalization process saps the morale and
energy of the maintenance organization and, on some
occasions, the practice may result in equipment damage, or
worse. Cannibalization is a risky practice used far too
often.
D. ALTERNATIVES TO CANNIBALIZATION
Cannibalization delivers to the maintenance manager a
timely component that is ready for flight with minimum
amount of effort. Cannibalization discounts logistic system
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failures and allows the maintenance manager to work in an
environment of low risk. Cannibalization can maximize
readiness, help meet most, if not all, operational
commitments placed on a squadron. However, at what cost do
we continue to look at cannibalization as the supply remedy
for logistic shortfalls? Cannibalization must be the last
option in resolving supply shortage issues
.
One alternative to reduce cannibalization, if
readiness and operational commitments remain the same, is
improve the logistic system to where MTBF data is accurate
and reflected in the acquisition process. This assures
users in the fleet that accurate spare levels are
sufficient to support operational requirements. Sufficient
parts provisioning results from realistic reliability
analyses and is updated as necessary.
A second alternative is to reduce turnaround time of
repairable parts. This simple option makes more parts
available to the supply system. Buying enough spares is the
correct first step, but that would only be a short-term fix
if maintenance facilities cannot keep up. Reducing
turnaround time of repairable parts and increasing spare
stockage levels must work together to decrease
cannibalization in the fleet.
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IV. READINESS/COST EFFECTS OF WARRANTY AND
CANNIBALIZATION ISSUES CONCERNING THE E-2C
AIRCRAFT
A. AN ANALYSIS
This chapter highlights and analyzes problems
discussed throughout this thesis concerning the E-2C
aircraft. The E-2C aircraft, as the fleet workhorse, is
used in most tactical operations. It supports not only the
airborne early warning community, but also drug
interdiction and search and rescue. With so many duties,
the E-2C is required to be ready when called upon, but
readiness problems that have plagued the E-2C and naval
aviation in general are taking their toll.
Information provided in the upcoming paragraphs will
alert the reader to the difficulties involved with solving
production and maintainability problems of an aging
aircraft. This chapter reviews: the E-2C aircraft
integrated logistical support concerns; readiness goals set
by CNO and why they may be impossible to achieve; man-hour
cannibalization costs; why manufacturers' warranty clauses
may help cause aircraft cannibalization; readiness costs of
the ASPA program; associated documentation problems; and
how future E-2C decisions may affect fleet readiness.
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B. INTEGRATED LOGISTICAL SUPPORT
An initial look at the E-2C suggests that the
maintainability problems might be traced back to the
beginning of the acquisition process. The E-2C community's
reliability to meet established integrated logistical
support (ILS) goals have contributed to the maintainability
problem.
1. Reliability and Maintainability
The Department of Defense (DOD) has made acquisition
reform a major priority in recent years. The aircraft
acquisition process has been improved as managers have
learned from past mistakes; now, reliability and
maintainability are major design criteria in naval aircraft
acquisition. Reliability is the probability that a system
will perform in a satisfactory manner for a given period of
time when used under specified operating conditions; that
is, the duration of fault free performance. Maintainability
is the ability to repair an aircraft in a given time period
assuming trained personnel and proper replacement parts; it
is described as the ability to restore an item to like-new
condition.
The E-2C aircraft has relied heavily on reliability
and maintainability engineering from the very beginning of
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the acquisition process. However, this aircraft has one of
the highest cannibalization rates among naval aircraft.
Cannibalization can, in part, be attributed to an aircraft
whose component parts fail prematurely or whose parts can
be removed and replaced quickly (in most cases in less than
15 minutes elapsed time) . In the view of the E-2C
maintenance manager, waiting for the supply system to react
to demand does not seem to be an alternative worth
considering.
When the E-2C was introduced into the acquisition
process, aircraft maintainability should have been a high
priority. However, that was not the case. Aircraft systems
tested during the development phase showed that reliability
estimates were overstated. In other words, MTBF on many
components were 50-60 percent less than anticipated.
The failure rates of the top 2 cannibalized
components for the E-2C from January 1998 to December 1999
are presented in Table 4.1. The Maintenance Replacement
Factor (MRF) along with the Rotable Pool Factor determines
the component failure rate using a formula developed by
NALDA. Failure rates are calculated by adding the MRF and
RPF. The current failure rate is compared to the previous
failure rate to determine whether the rate is increasing or
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decreasing for those items. (Williams, 1997) Table 4.1,
shows failure rates are increasing for 13 of 20 E-2C
components. This means that the components are failing more
frequently than estimated. Suggesting that insufficient
testing was performed during the acquisition cycle or that
poor test results did not result in redesign of faulty
components
.
Replacement parts are procured for new aircraft from
data established during testing. If the data is inaccurate
or ignored, planning data will be inaccurate. Spare parts
procurement for the E-2C was 50-60 percent short of actual
requirements. This explains why the E-2C has one of the
highest cannibalization rates among naval aircraft.
Although wing maintenance Master Chiefs recognize that
aircraft are sometimes cannibalized for convenience, in the
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During an interview with Commander (CDR) Roy Moore,
Assistant Program Manager Logistics (APML) for the E-2C
aircraft, he discussed program funding. CDR Moore, a
professional logistician, who is knowledgeable of the E-2C
acquisition, asserted that budget constraints were a causal
factor for not buying sufficient spares to adequately
support readiness goals. The budget will always be a factor
in any acquisition process, but more so today.
In the 1980 's, when funding for the E-2C Group II
aircraft was appropriated, the military acquisition budget
was at its highest level since World War II. What happened?
Why did we not fix the problem in the 1980s when we had the
money and opportunity to do so? The apparent answer:
logistics has taken a back seat to operations . The
acquisition process fields the system, then worries how to
support that system later.
Insufficient logistical support is exactly what
happened with the E-2C aircraft. Accurate reliability tests
would have proven that MTBF of many of the E-2C components
was a tenth of the contractor's reliability predictions.
Logistics support must be emphasized early in the
acquisition process to obtain the most reliable and
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maintainable components possible. Then if testing or fleet
data shows the MTBF of a component is higher than expected,
adjust the spare requirement so that appropriate spare
parts are procured to match the new parameter.
If government personnel used the null hypothesis to
ensure failure rates were accurate and insisted that the
contractor prove planned MFHBF rates, then E-2C aircraft
would not be experiencing the problems that exist today.
(Blanchard, 1998)
Program Managers (PM) are government representatives;
they must ensure that government is purchasing the best
possible product. Costs drive a program decisions. If the
PM is under or at their budget cost for a particular
program, their program is on track. If the program is over
budget, it is off track which can cause program
cancellation, or, in some instances, cause the Program
Manager to lose his job. The PM feels extraordinary
pressure to hold down cost and maintain schedule by letting
the contractor off the hook on component reliability or
maintainability. The PM is always concerned that technical
problems will delay the program or increase program costs.
In reality, this is exactly where PMs should "earn
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their paycheck." It is much easier and less expensive to
solve a problem early and up- front in the acquisition
process, before it becomes a fleet problem. Too many times,
decisions to push a product through the developmental cycle
cause unnecessary problems down-stream. Poor decisions to
move ahead with suspect programs soon become problems for
the technician who repairs or replaces components that fail
prematurely. The remedy is to ensure that reliability
achieves required standards. The cost, if reliability goals
are not realized can be counted in degraded readiness,
retention, and morale.
Retired Rear Admiral Donald Eaton put the logistic
situation in focus in a document representing the feelings
of many frustrated logisticians "Revolution in Logistic
Affairs A New Strategy) . Many of the observations presented
in the paper seem reasonable. According to Admiral Eaton:
Cultural change is the most important and most powerful
step we can take to improve logistics in the 21 st
century. Overcoming cultural inertia is difficult. We
can no longer afford to make bad logistics trade-offs
early in a program and attempt to make up for them with
increased labor at the operational unit or by the
application of some ad hoc modification and hope it
works. The cannibalization rates are higher than ever
for even our newest airplanes. The hidden costs of
increased labor by sailors, airman, and soldiers are
enormous in terms of mission opportunity costs, reduced
retention and mistakes in documentation, which distort
the true readiness picture.
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Our leadership's mindset about logistic support must
change. Logistics can no longer take a back seat during the
acquisition process, or throughout the lifecycle of any-
platform.
C. READINESS GOALS
Personnel shortages and rising maintenance costs have
contributed to the E-2C maintainability difficulties over
the past five years. The E-2C aircraft has difficulty
maintaining the readiness goals set by CNO: 70 percent
mission capable (MC) and 54 percent fully mission capable
(FMC) . Critical shortages of replacement components,
logistical support, decreasing budgets, and shifting
priorities across operational commitments all degrade
readiness. Table 4.2 displays FMC and MC rates during the
past five years for the E-2C Atlantic and Pacific fleets.
Notice neither fleet attained the FMC goal set by CNO and
only the Pacific, fleet was within the 7 percent MC rate.
(OPNAV 5442. 4M, 1990)
FY95 FY96 FY97 FY98 FY99 Average %
Atlantic Fleet %MC 71.9 66.6 66.5 69.7 69.7 68.88
%FMC 51 53.4 49.1 40.3 40.3 46.82
Pacific Fleet %MC 73.2 70.5 68.3 71.9 71.9 71.16
%FMC 55.4 49.4 51 32.7 32.7 44.24
Source: AV-3M Aircraft Summary Report (A7049) March 2000
Table 4.2 E-2C Readiness Rates
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D. MAN-HOUR COSTS
Cannibalization costs are reflected in both the added
material costs of parts that are damaged or worn out
prematurely due to frequent maintenance and the man-hour
costs of performing repetitive maintenance. Removing and
replacing parts twice for cannibalization increases
maintenance man-hours. The two-year cost of the extra man-
hours for both fleets is summarized in Table 4.3. From the
data, it is apparent that we cannot afford to cannibalize
continuous ly
.
Aircraft Command CANN ACT DMMH DMMH Costs
E-2C Atlantic Fleet 1,812 579,517 36,694,181
E-2C Pacific Fleet 2,351 335,720 21,296,009
Total 4,163 915,237 $57,990,190
Source: LMDSS End Item/Claimant Report January 1998 to December 1999
Table 4.3 Total E-2C Cannibalization Costs
E. PROPRIETARY SERVICE REQUIREMENTS WITHIN MANUFACTURES'
WARRANTY CLAUSES
The proprietary service requirements imbedded in
contract warranty clauses cause concern in the E-2C
community. Proprietary service allows only the
manufacturers or contractor to repair their specific piece
of equipment during the warranty period. Many E-2C systems
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require contractor support because proprietary service
written into the contract does not allow intermediate
maintenance level support by military technicians.
Example: The E-2C aircraft Enhanced Main Display Unit
(EMDU) is a vital piece of radar equipment that displays
incoming air traffic on a video screen. The EMDU
encompasses all the problems that have been discussed
throughout this thesis. The actual MTBF for this component
is half of the planned reliability according to
COMAEWWINGLANT Maintenance Master Chief. (Barnes, 2 000)
Aviation Maintenance and Material Management (AV-3M) data
reflect the fleet spent 1,218.40 man-hours cannibalizing
the EMDU in the last 18 months. This component ranked
number one for E-2C cannibalized parts based on man-hours.
Yet, only half of needed spare EMDU's were purchased and
available in the supply system. The chance of a "stock out"
is very high when operational demands increase.
The problem: When a component needs to be replaced and
a replacement is available in supply, maintenance personnel
typically requisition another component from supply.
However, because supply only carries half of the needed
EMDU inventory, the part may not be available (Harvey,
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2 000) . If the EMDU is not available in the immediate supply-
system, the squadron is forced to remove the bad EMDU from
the aircraft and return it to AIMD for repair. However, the
EMDU is a proprietary system, which is supposed to be
repaired by a contractor from L3 Communications, a sub-
contractor for the Northrop/Grumman Corporation. Normally
delays ashore are minor; the contractor works at the local
AIMD and repairs the EMDU when it is inducted into the
supply system.
In contrast, the process becomes very complicated when
a squadron at sea needs a replacement EMDU. Deployed
aircraft carriers used to carry contractor personnel when
deployed; since the defense budget drawdown, fewer
contractors are deploying. Thus, the bad EMDU must be
removed from the aircraft and prepared for shipment to the
nearest AIMD ashore. The EMDU is repaired and shipped back
to the aircraft carrier for disposition. For example,
Atlantic fleet squadrons send the EMDU to AIMD Norfolk.
This procedure, called repair and return (R&R) , is time
consuming and not very efficient when an aircraft needs a
replacement component immediately.
In response to the inefficiencies of the R&R policy
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for the EMDU, the Atlantic fleet E-2C wing formulated a
plan to restructure the original contract. The new plan
allows the contractor to train organizational and
intermediate maintenance personnel in repairing the EMDU.
By the end of fiscal year 00 the plan will be totally
implemented. The new training procedure eliminates the need
for the proprietary services contract clause, and improves
EMDU turnaround time both ashore and afloat.
F. READINESS COSTS OF ASPA AND PDM SCHEDULES
Aircraft Service Period Adjustment (ASPA) inspection
was developed to provide long term cost savings by
deferring aircraft from depot maintenance. Naval Aviation
Logistics Center (NALC) at Patuxent River, Maryland created
the ASPA program in 1983. The program was developed to
reduce Standard Depot Level Maintenance (SDLM) costs per
aircraft (Eaton, 2000). In 1983, depot inductions were
reduced from 72 to 420 aircraft and the Navy realized a
one-time savings of $300 million. The ASPA program included
an inspection conducted at the end of the aircraft
Operating Service Period (OSP) to determine if depot
induction was required. Each aircraft inducted into SDLM
had a contract base cost of $1 million. The ASPA inspection
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determined whether an aircraft could be extended for one
year or should be inducted into the depot as scheduled. The
squadrons prepared the aircraft and NADEP personnel
conducted the inspection and determined if the aircraft
could be waived from induction into the depot.
Over time, the ASPA program had adverse effects on the
E-2C program. First, the NADEPs had difficulty in properly
planning work for depot personnel because fewer aircraft
were inducted than were scheduled. Second, lack of
regularly scheduled maintenance gradually reduced the
demand for parts from the supply system resulting in
reduced spare parts stockage levels. Third, it was common
to extend an aircraft for three to five years, increasing
the number of problems each aircraft had when it finally
arrived at the NADEP. This increased dispersion of the
required repair time. Fourth, ASPA lengthened the time
required for an aircraft to complete SDLM, because the
depot had to inspect each aircraft to identify problems
before they could order the needed parts. Each aircraft
inducted had different problems. With the ASPA program,
Standard Depot Level Maintenance was no longer "standard."
Long lead times were required to obtain needed parts to
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complete aircraft maintenance. As a result, depots
cannibalized new inductees to repair aircraft completing
SDLM and return them to the fleet. (Griffea, 1998)
During the 1990 's, ASPA was no longer an issue for the
E-2C. Aging aircraft and increasing electrical wiring
issues caused the fleet to request that NADEP North Island
(NI) induct more E-2C aircraft into SDLM. The request
caused a rework backlog of almost two years for NADEP NI,
because more than 2 percent of the current E-2C aircraft
were already overdue for SDLM induction, according to the
Atlantic, type wing assistant maintenance officer. (Lawson,
2000)
Despite the rework backlog, aircraft were still being
scheduled for ASPA inspections because the aircraft were
reaching the end of their operating service period. This
new dilemma caused NADEP inspectors to grant ASPA aircraft
a one-year extension; there was insufficient capacity at
NADEP NI to induct them. However, the extension cost the
squadron hundreds of man-hours in repair and
cannibalization. The NADEP inspectors averaged well over
3 00 maintenance discrepancies per aircraft inspection. Many
of the discrepancies were categorized as critical, meaning
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they had to be repaired before releasing the aircraft as
safe for flight. A typical fleet squadron takes, on
average; over six weeks of dual-shift maintenance to remove
discrepancies from an ASPA inspected aircraft.
In the end, the ASPA program started a vicious cycle
that reduced the spare part stockage level, due to low
demand data, and increased reliance on cannibalizations to
get operational aircraft to the fleet.
1. Phase Depot Maintenance
Phase Depot Maintenance (PDM) is a Navy concept
developed to mirror the Air Force and airlines' rigid
periodic depot maintenance and planned depot maintenance
programs, respectively. Phase Depot Maintenance, developed
to replace the ASPA program, incurred the same problems as
the original ASPA program: slipping induction dates and
NADEP backlogs. In the Air Force program, aircraft are
inducted as scheduled on a set time based solely on
calendar time. The difference between the two programs is
that the Air Force and airlines have short depot turn-
around times, usually less than 90 days (and for the
airlines as short as a week) , while the Navy program
consistently exceeds 18 months.
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In the Air Force and airlines' system, no waivers are
granted. When an aircraft is scheduled for induction into
either system, the aircraft is sent to the depot for rework
as scheduled. Wide time dispersions are not a problem in
these systems because each aircraft arrives with the same
time period between scheduled maintenance periods . Rework
variance of 100-200 maintenance man-hours is normal,
compared to 20,000-30,000 man-hour variances for a typical
E-2C aircraft coming in for rework. It is easy to see why
the Navy has SDLM backlogs and part shortages
.
The airlines cannot afford to have a 747 out of
commission for over 90 days; the airline would lose too
much revenue. The Navy needs to think about their phase
depot maintenance system in the same way: not as... a profit
making business for the NADEP but for what it can save the
Navy in overall efficiency and reduced SDLM costs. Changing
the Navy concept might be a burden at first, but it would
save the Navy time and money with improved products and
increased readiness.
G. DOCUMENTATION
There were many inconsistencies in the data collected.
Data from the Logistic Management Decision Support System
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(LMDSS) reports varied significantly from AV-3M reports
that came from the NALDA database at NAVAIR. Many of the
requested reports provided conflicting information.
Cannibalization data extracted from COMAEWWINGPAC
cannibalization spreadsheet differed greatly from the data
stored in the NALDA database. COMAEWWINGLANT used
cannibalization data provided by individual E-2C squadrons
under their control. Although the Atlantic fleet data
differed from the NALDA database, the wing indicated
individual squadrons provided the most accurate and useful
cannibalization information. However, NALDA is supposed to
construct its database from squadron reports submitted
monthly to a central depository. Data provided in the
monthly reports is assembled, analyzed and then distributed
among the many NALDA databases
.
Inconsistencies between databases make it almost
impossible, to extract accurate information. Maintenance
managers make important decisions based on NALDA data; it
is in the best interest of all concerned to provide
information that is as accurate as possible. For example, a
visit to COMAEWWINGLANT indicated the need to develop one
data source that archives all AV-3M data and tracks
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cannibalization trends. A database that automatically
prompts inventory management activities to update failure
rates and makes necessary procurement adjustments to
reflect real time material shortages and component
shortfalls would eliminate the need for multiple databases.
This would create information that is much more reliable
for the user.
H. FUTURE E-2C DECISIONS
The program office has another opportunity to correct
readiness shortfalls while introducing the next generation
E-2C aircraft, The Hawkeye 2000. CDR Moore, E-2C APML,
indicated that the Hawkeye 2000 is a production aircraft,
but it shares many systems with the E-2C Group II aircraft.
Both aircraft use the APS-145 radar, a radar system that is
presently 11 years old with documented reliability
weakness. If the APS-145 radar is installed in the Hawkeye
2000, with the same problems as previous versions of the E-
2C aircraft, this will prolong existing fleet radar
maintenance problems until the scheduled radar system
replacement in 2015. By the time the APS-145 radar is
retired, it will have served in the E-2 aircraft for over
2 6 years, still exhibiting problems that originated in the
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1980s. Defective designs not corrected during the original
development process over 2 years ago are still prevalent
today. The E-2C will continue to incur problems with
manufacturers' warranties and cannibalization issues if the
E-2 community does not take a more active role in resolving
these widely recognized problems.
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V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. OBJECTIVES
This thesis analyzed both cannibalization and warranty-
issues and their effect on the E-2C aircraft. The analysis
included warranty and cannibalization structures for the
Pacific and Atlantic fleets, and personnel and readiness
costs. This thesis examined the impacts of manufacturers'
warranties and aircraft cannibalization on the
maintainability of the E-2C aircraft.
B. CONCLUSIONS
The following are the conclusions of this research:
As described in Chapter II:
1. Manufacturers' warranties do contribute to aircraft
cannibalization. Reliability and maintainability warranties
help determine spare stockage levels. This thesis
determined that inaccurate R&M estimates created stockage
shortfalls in many of the top cannibalized components of
the E-2C.
As described in Chapter III:
2
.
Shortages in the supply system and slow response




Increased operational commitments force squadrons
to cannibalize due to shortages of available parts.
4. Cannibalization causes repetitive maintenance and
is costly. It depletes resources that could be used for
other maintenance/activities.
As described in Chapter IV:
5. Introducing production aircraft to the fleet with-
out proper logistical support increases aircraft
cannibalization and decreases readiness.
6
.
The ASPA and PDM programs delay scheduled
maintenance, resulting in the total failure of some
components, consequently increasing the overall cost and
time of SDLM inductions.
7 There were many inconsistencies among the different
data sources. Logistics Management Decision Support System
(LMDSS) and Naval Aviation Maintenance and Material
Management System (AV-3M) reports came from the NALDA
database, but provided conflicting information.
C . RECOMMENDATIONS
The following are recommendations from this research:
1. Develop an acquisition strategy where logistics is
given appropriate priority and attention. Too many times
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logistics is secondary when establishing milestones, but it
is the first option used when budget cuts occur.
2
.
Minimize cannibalizations and only use to meet
critical operational commitments. Cannibalizations should
not be used simply for convenience or to increase aircraft
readiness
.
3 Minimize the use of proprietary service within
manufactures' warranties to permit repairs by the
technician in the fleet. We cannot expect expeditious
component repairs if we do not give the technician adequate
opportunities to make repairs that they are trained and
equipped to do
.
4. Adjust the ASPA and PDM programs to mirror the
commercial airlines' programs. Do not grant waivers or
extensions when aircraft exceed their operating service
period. This will tighten dispersion in depot turnaround
time and decrease labor costs.
5. Withhold introducing new aircraft systems to the
fleet until shared legacy systems are supported properly,
thereby decreasing cannibalization and increasing
readiness
.
6. Establish one data source that historically
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archives all Aviation Maintenance 3M data. NALDA databases,
continuously updated, have made great improvements for
extracting data. However, cannibalization trends in this
database should automatically prompt inventory management




The following is a list of acronyms as they are used
in this thesis:
AEW Airborne Early Warning
AIMD Aircraft Intermediate Maintenance Department
AMRR Aviation Maintenance Readiness Reports
APML Assistant Program Manager Logistics
ASPA Aircraft Service Period Adjustment
AVCAL Aviation Consolidated Allowance List
AV-3M Aviation Maintenance, Material, and Management
BIT Built in Test
CNAL Commander Naval Air Force Atlantic
CNAP Commander Naval Air Force Pacific
CNO Chief of Naval Operations
DMMH Direct Maintenance Man-hours
DOD Department of Defense
ECP Engineering Change Proposal
EMDU Enhanced Main Display Unit
FMC Fully Mission Capable
ILS Integrated Logistical Support
LMDSS Logistic Management Decision Support System
MC Mission Capable
MCMT Mean Corrective Maintenance Time
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MFHBF Mean Flight Hours Between Failures
MRF Maintenance Replacement Factor
MTBF Mean Time Between Failures
NADEP Naval Aviation Depot
NALC Naval Aviation Logistics Center
NALDA Naval Aviation Logistics Data Analysis
NAMP Naval Aviation Maintenance Program
NAS Naval Air Station
NAVAIR Naval Air Systems Command
NAVICP Navy Inventory Control Point
NMCS Non Mission Capable Supply
OSD Office of the Secretary of Defense
OSP Operating Service Period
PDM Phased Depot Maintenance
PM Program Manager
PMC Partially Mission Capable
PMCS Partially Mission Capable Supply
R&M Reliability and Maintainability
RFP Rotable Pool Factor
SDLM Standard Depot Level Maintenance
VIDS/MAF Visual Information Display/Maintenance Action Form
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